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Abstract: The rapid increase of the Internet connectivity
and the data publishing activity, like user-generated con-
tent, has lead Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to establish
more efficient mechanisms for content delivery, such
as caching. Mechanisms such as content-aware-networks
and in-network caching reduce network load, server load,
and user response time, thus, manage the network. How-
ever, caching of content also raises major implications in
terms of legal acts and bills (e.g., data privacy, copyright),
dealing with access control, validation scheme, and regu-
lations (e.g., contractual obligation, legal restrictions).
In general, user-generated content is linked with sen-
sitive information, such as geographical information, med-
ical and financial information, personal identifiable data,
photos, videos, and contact information. Therefore, it is
essential to secure data and regulate access. The latter, is
gained by including access control mechanisms in the
data exchange process, where a user requesting data must
prove his access rights. Therefore, a user has to show an
access ticket, which includes his rights based on legal and
regulative implications. In order to secure any kind of data
exchange, authentication of each participating communi-
cation entity (e.g., content owner, server, and end-user) is
essential, which is part of the proposed two-way authenti-
cation handshake in this paper that is performed to gener-
ate a secure communication channel.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that
transmission, storage, and usage of user-generated data in
caches within the network is manageable within the legal
laws on sensitivity, copyright, and privacy. The scope of
studying these laws, acts, and policies is restricted to Swit-
zerland (CH), the European Union (EU), and the United
States of America (USA). Finally, a solution is presented
including access ticketing and two-way authenticationme-
chanismsbasedoncommonstandards from IPnetworks.
Index Terms: User-generated content, legal policies, con-
tent-aware networks, caching, trust, DTLS.
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I Introduction
Over the past decades user-generated content has in-
creased manifold. In the USA 82 million people (42.5% of
the total of Internet users) created such content in 2008
[40]. A wide variety of applications and Web sites allow
publication and viewing of such content, e.g., Flickr [23],
Instagram [16], SoundCloud [38], FanFiction.net [15].
These can be categorized into (1) social media Web sites
(e.g., Facebook [8] or Twitter [7]) and (2) content sharing
Web sites or applications (e.g., YouTube [14] or MySpace
[11]). Both categories have in common that the content is
available to a broad audience and that circulated content
contains sensitive information of the publisher. Personal
information through profiles on social networking sites,
user behavior, and copyright information through videos,
pictures, and text published on the Internet, are important
sensitive information linked to user-generated content.
Furthermore ISPs try to reduce response time to the request
of content by the user, network, and server load by em-
ploying caches in the network [27]. Therefore, it is essential
that such private and sensitive information is transmitted
to users and stored at locations (e.g., caches, servers),
which are authenticated and trustworthy. One possibility
to bring trustworthiness into the communication way is
to perform an authentication process before exchanging
data.
Legal regulations, in general, aim to protect private
information of the content owner from being propagated
in the network without the consent of the owner. User-
generated content raises legal questions in terms of in-
tellectual property, defamation, copyright, and privacy
rights. Any private information is to be safeguarded from
being publicly available, and from malicious attacks. The
Swiss and EU Copyright Laws do not allow uploading,
transmitting, or copying any copyrighted material without
the consent of the content owner. In such a case the legal
framework holds the content publisher responsible of the
illegal act [31], [10]. The Swiss law permits copying the
content, without the consent of content owner, however
for private use only. However, copying content in caches
located in the network cannot be included in the scope of
private use. The World Intellectual Property Organization
Copyright Treaty (WCT) is included within the Digital Mil-
DOI 10.1515/pik-2013-0042 PIK 2013; aop
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet | 130.60.47.58
Heruntergeladen am | 29.01.14 08:01
lennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in USA [43], [17]. Since the
last decade, the European Union also follows this treaty,
by the virtue of which, circumventing technical protection
measures is also prohibited. Illegal access, transmission,
and uploading of any private content are subject to legal
consequences of privacy and security breaches [43]. The
content transcends many national borders, with the con-
tent owner in one country, the content publisher in an-
other, the cache owner in a third, and the user in fourth.
When cross-border wrongs (torts) are committed they lead
to cross-national litigations [6]. Such litigations can be
only completed when the liable party, e.g., content owner,
content publisher, cache owner, or ISPs, can be identified
appropriately.
Fig. 1: Assumed Scenario Overview.
The goal of any content distribution network is, therefore,
twofold. First, the content has to be delivered with higher
efficiency and second, the content delivery process has to
be in accordance with legal and regulatory requirements,
both determining network and service management func-
tionality. Based on those observations made, this paper
addresses the following questions, which to the best of the
authors’ knowledge have not been addressed so far:
1) What are the legal and regulative implications of using
caches in the network?
2) Does a two-way handshake authentication solve the
technical requirements to bemet?
3) How can a trust-based system on the basis of such a
two-way handshake authentication solve legal impli-
cations and service management needs of caches in
the network?
Hence, this paper presents an approach to authenticate
the cached content when (a) it is reused by a user, (b) a
different user within the same ISP (owner of the nearest
cache to a user) requests the same content for the first time,
and (c) a user of a different ISP (not the owner of the
nearest cache to the user) requests the same content for
the first time. This method can be applied to cache-based
content delivery networks, to authenticate users and the
content before it is transferred via the cache. This authenti-
cation is done to ensure that only legitimate users, as per
the legal requirements, have access to the content in ca-
ches. This paper concentrates on user-generated content,
because (1) such content is heavily cached by content
distribution networks, and (2) if monitored and attacked,
private and sensitive information about users publishing
and consuming (especially viewing and downloading)
such content can be retrieved. Due to the main use of
caches in cases of delivering user-generated data, the pro-
posal of this work on establishing a trust-based system for
authenticating entities exchanging content provides the
most beneficial outcomes in terms of fulfilling legal, ser-
vice management, and network management require-
ments. Figure 1 illustrates the aforementioned scenario (cf.
Section IV).
Today, the security model of the Internet is based on
authentication for connection end points [26]. For caching
in content-centric networks the content object authentica-
tion is required [18]. This means, once an object leaves the
original server, its identification has to be still verifiable at
any in-network storing locations. This will help to over-
come various problems of caching, such as that of copy-
right and privacy. The trust-based two-way authentication
handshake is a method by which the technical benefits of
caches, e.g., efficient content delivery, and reduced net-
work load, can be achieved along with fulfilling the regu-
latory requirement of safeguarding the private information
linked with the content. This means access to information
is only granted, when it leads to none of these possible law
infringements, e.g., copyright infringement, security, and
privacy breach. Also, serving copies of content from ca-
ches complicates rewarding of benefits in terms of mone-
tary and non-monetary incentives to the content owner or
publisher. Such a mechanism of authenticating every ac-
cess to content in caches can also safeguard such interests.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II outlines basic terminology, followed by related
work in Section III. Discussion on legal and regulative
constraints for caching is presented in Section IV. The
scenario assumed is described in Section V and a brief
characterization of the proposed solution, including ac-
cess ticketing and authentication process, is presented.
This section also includes the proof of concept of the
recommended solution. Finally, Section VII concludes the
work and addresses future work.
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II Terminology
Content is information that provides value to the end-user
in some context. User-generated content means consumer-
generated digital content. Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has defined three
schools of user-generated content under which, the con-
tent should be published in some context, e.g., on a social
networking site, a content owner must add own value to
the work, and such content is created outside any profes-
sional routines and practices [44].
A stakeholder can be defined as any kind of entity,
who has an interest in the process of generating, transmit-
ting, and using user-generated content.
A content owner creates and owns the content. He can
also gain benefits in terms of implicit (e.g., social status)
and explicit (e.g., monetary) incentives.
A content publisher disseminates the content to a wider
audience with a monetary benefit. A content publisher is
every entity, which wants to publish data (e.g., content
owner). Cache owners are those stakeholders in a content
delivery system, who own the in-network storing locations
(e.g.,servers or routers) -termed caches -that are strategi-
cally chosen by an ISP. In comparison to content publish-
ers, entities exist in the network that want to access
data, which are called content subscribers (e.g., such as
(end-)users). Caches, servers, and ISPs are special entities,
because they can act either as a content publisher or a
subscriber depending on the performed role in the commu-
nication way.
Fig. 2: ER Diagram for Stakeholders.
Figure 2 summarizes all relationships between different
stakeholders in an entity-relationship (ER) diagram, where
the attribute type stands for (end-)user, ISP, server, or
routers determining the concrete entity.
III Related work
In Content-centric Networks (CCN) content is transmitted
in terms of named objects rather than in a location-depen-
dent manner [18]. In CCNs caching mechanisms are de-
ployed at the network layer. This leads to a major reduc-
tion in content retrieval time and bandwidth consumption
[20], [18]. Transparent Caching (TC) involves the deploy-
ment of intelligent caches in the network to deliver the
content fast and more efficiently [29]. This type of caching
does not require ISPs to form a contract with the content
owner in order to distribute or copy the original content,
as it introduces no additional access point, which might
lead to security breach, and also the final delivery con-
firmation is always done by the original server [29]. The
status quo of research on establishing cache-based con-
tent delivery systems together with taking measures to
prevent legal consequences is low. This is because re-
search only concentrate on improving the efficiency of
such systems and neglect to incorporate the legal re-
quirements. Researchers have attempted to improve priv-
acy [1], [21] and security [36], [20], [18] issues of CCNs.
However, the past research fails to adapt the technology
to safeguard the rights of the content publisher in terms of
copyright, leakage of sensitive private information, and
proper monetary and non-monetary incentives. Thus, Sec-
tion IV explores the key legal aspects of such a technical
approach.
Caches are susceptible to attacks, which may spoil the
content or retrieve sensitive information of the publisher
or the user [13]. TC, which can be used without the end
user and content publisher being aware of, is even more
fatal [29]. As a consequence, it is essential to establish a
trust-based mechanism for authenticating any request for
accessing the content stored in the caches.
Even though researchers acknowledge such implica-
tions [39], not much research is done from the perspective
of caching for user-generated content, which does not lead
to any legal implications. A high level study has been done
for analyzing legal implications of caching in peer-to-peer
networks [33]. Google caches provide the possibility for
the user to bypass the registration process on a Website,
hence, making it more susceptible to privacy and security
breaches [42]. Privacy attacks on cached content can be
based on concept of monitoring ‘access to specific content
objects by another users connected to same cache’ [21].
This means that the content cached in the network can be
a source of private information related to content viewer
also (e.g., usage patterns or preferences). Adding random
delays for new requests and routers will make the identifi-
cation of a cache location by attackers difficult [24], which
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in turn will make the retrieval of private information of
content viewer more complicated.
Upon summarizing existing work it can be pointed out
that its focus is on efficiency improvements for content
delivery networks, however, typically it lacks the consid-
eration of legal requirements for any content access com-
bined with required authenticationmeans.
IV Legal and regulative implications
The understanding of caching both from CCNs and the
TC’s point of view lead to implications in terms of data
protection, privacy, security, copyright. As mentioned be-
fore, monitoring usage of cached content of any content
publishing platform on the cache can reveal patterns of
end-user behavior [24]. Also, traces of cached content can
reveal private information about content owners, such as
personal profile details. Caching entities located within a
network (e.g., routers, in-network servers, or users) can
only be used, if they are trustworthy. This is essential, as it
ensures that only those entities have access to the data,
which do not violate any legal rules. By law caching en-
tities are not allowed tomodify the content in any way [10],
[17], [43]. However, measures should be taken to ensure
that this holds good. For example, Jet Stream, a content
delivery system, identifies that transcoding content in real
time to lower bit rates is illegal from the net neutrality
perspective [25]. This is in fact illegal, as this implies chan-
ging the content. Even when the content publisher has a
contract with the content owner to publish content on the
Internet, it is forbidden to change a single bit of the con-
tent. The content stored in caches are copies of the original
content, therefore, having no identifiable link to the origi-
nal copy. This makes identifying copyrights, benefit distri-
bution to the content owner more difficult. Therefore, it is
important to authenticate or encrypt content objects, and
to request authentication of communication entities by
supporting two-way authentication when establishing a
secure communication channel. The recommendation of
authentication before any access request is granted en-
sures that the copy of the content cached is always authen-
ticated with respect to the original content source.
The severity of these concerns can vary depending on
the way contracts and caching entity owners’ treat licen-
sing of rights. Also, when incentives of stakeholders in-
volved in such a scenario deal with pecuniary benefits,
implications become more tangled. This is because each
copy of the original content might not be linked to the
source of the content and, therefore, identifying the owner
of the content may be difficult. If the content owner does
not get accurate benefits, it might lead to a dispute, be-
tween content owner and content publisher. The most
important legal implications of caching in the network
from the perspective of protecting the private information
and benefits for the content owner includes aspects of
copyright infringement, liability of content, and incentives
of content distribution.
A Copyright Infringement
Copyright issues related to user-generated content arise in
several ways. Copyright liability of the content delivery
entities, like ISPs or cache owner, who without modifi-
cation or copying deliver the content, has exemptions by
being called ‘safe harbors’, see DMCA [17] and the EU
Electronic Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC [10]. However,
a modification of the content for storing it in caches is
not allowed. Also, these laws encourage services, which
monitor activities on caches and forbid any illegal activ-
ities. However, in-network caching is transparent in nat-
ure. Hence, questions like where the data is residing and
from where it is has been accessed cannot be answered.
As a result liability of infringement cannot be identified.
This makes it interesting for attackers to attack caches
and retrieve copyright information. This grows complex,
when such attack types are established for content in
transit. The eligibly of a content publisher and cache own-
er as passive entities (who have no control and knowledge
about the content) is still undefined. Copyright infringe-
ment by definition questions the reproduction, distribu-
tion, and display of copyrighted content. However, con-
sequences of such infringements can also serve as threats
in the field of incentives, e.g., monetary benefits due to
copyright royalty. Section 103 of the WIPO Copyright and
Performance and Phonograms Treaties Implementation
Act strictly forbids the circumvention of the copy mea-
surement systems [17]. Hence, copyrighted material by
law in Switzerland, EU, and the USA cannot be copied
into caches, without prior knowledge and consent of the
owner.
B Privacy Protection
A report by OECD stated that content publishers, who
provide a platform for content owners to display content
(e.g., media files or textual information) get a ‘limited
irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully
paid-up, worldwide license (with the right to sub license)
to use, modify, publicly display, reproduce, and distribute
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such content through the particular site’ [44]. This occurs
as soon as a user signs general terms and conditions with
any content publisher, mostly without noticing. The con-
sequences for users of giving such permission are that the
content publisher now has a right to utilize benefits, with-
out giving a fair share to the content owner. As these rights
are transferable, ISPs or cache owners can get the author-
ity to store and modify the original content anywhere in
the network, in order to efficiently deal with user requests.
Now without the permission of the content owner, content
publishers, ISPs, and cache owners can use content. This
means, again the fair share of incentive for the content
owner cannot be guaranteed.
The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC of the EU [9]
treats unknown monitoring or profiling of any sort as
illegal. This law further defines that any information that
could be traced to an individual should be treated as
private. Therefore, storing of recent or popular requests
from the end-user in caches leads to ISPs being informal
eavesdroppers recognizing usage patterns, likings, and
disliking of the end-user. For example, any activity on an
online music portal, if cached, can depict user behavior
(which can also be attributed as private information, as it
can trace an individual end-user). Private sensitive state
can be associated to content with respect to the circum-
stances it is requested in [11], [20]. Not only this, but access
to router caches allows end-users (who have access to the
same router cache) to obtain information about their near-
by users’ content access patterns [1].
Removal of content can never be guaranteed in case
of caching. Even if the content owner decides to delete
the content, this content will still exist in the network,
since deleting or overwriting the content from all caches
is not feasible. Debatin et al. investigated this control
loss on published content in Facebook. They found out
that Facebook works with thousands of content copies in
caches, where deleted content (e.g., picture) is still alive
after more than three years, although the content owner
had deleted the original source [41]. Such caching fea-
tures forces the content owner to encrypt content to
overcome the risk of stealing ‘non-existent’ data from
caches.
Current content delivery systems concentrate on (1)
providing newest content to the end-user in an efficient
manner and (2) performing content delivery invisible to
the content owner and end-user. However, caches store
meta information of stored content and, thus, can provide
information about private communication traces, which
can be exploited by attackers to compromise privacy of the
user [20]. Even if content is encrypted, as performed in
current content delivery systems nowadays, information
can be leaked from meta information, such as content
type, source, time stamp, and size.
C Liability of Content
Liability means responsibilty of content in terms of secur-
ity, privacy, and legality. The onus of liability for content
that is in transit and is stored in caches is under constant
debate [30]. As soon as the content leaves the original
server the liability becomes unclear. ISPs deny the liabili-
ty, as they prefer to be categorized as passive entities,
which merely transfer the content in a more efficient way
with the help of caches to end-users [17], [10]. However,
leaking of sensitive information to a user, a group of users,
or organizations should be taken care of by cache owners
or content delivery systems. For uploading illegal content
(e.g., illegal copyrighted work or child pornography) onto
the Internet, content owner and content publishers are
liable [43]. This is, because the content owner owns con-
tent and the content publisher facilitates the transmission.
D Incentive Distribution
Serving end-users’ requests from caches is a complicated
task, when incentives for the content owners have to be
evaluated [2]. This is because if the cache serves copies of
the original content, the original server is not aware of the
request of the content from the end-user. In order to
illustrate this task, consider scenario shown in Figure 1,
where a media file is stored in a cache and is requested by
an end-user in a particular ISP or the first time. Instead of
retrieving the content from the original server for each
subsequent request, it will be served from this cache.
Assuming that the content displaying Web sites connects
advertisements with this media file. When requests are
served from caches in the network, the latest copy of the
content is not retrieved from the server each time. In such
a scenario share of benefits (both, monetary and non-
monetary) for the content owner is not guaranteed. This
happens, because there is no way to assure that the
acknowledgment of re-requests of content is also sent to
the original server. It can under no circumstances be
guaranteed through formal methods that the retrieved
content is the most recent content on the original ser-
ver [5], because the caches refresh their content periodi-
cally (e.g., reference [18]). This content update can happen
either from the original source or from caches in the
Internet. As a consequence, the content publisher looses
his control over the user access to his content. If this is the
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case, misuses of the caching capabilities can happen,
such as duplication, deletion or manipulation of original
content. This potential misuse leads to monetary and
credibility losses to content owner and to any type of
content publisher.
E Discussion
Legal questions rise when data is cached independent of
the performed way. Data can either be cached transpar-
ently, which means that no contract exist between content
owner and cache owners, or in manner of CCN strategies
where a chain of contracts between content owner, provi-
der, cache owner, and subscriber exists. In CCN case, the
copying of content based on the name, as introduced in
Section III, is a high threat. In comparison, copying and
disseminating information from the in-network cache
without informing the content owner, as performed in
transparent caching, raises questions of privacy and copy-
right. The most crucial implication of deploying caches in
the network from the legal and regulative point of view can
be summarized at follows:
Protection: The user-generated content is not only copy-
righted material, but also contains private and sensitive
information of content owners. Storing the content in ca-
ches can lead to privacy breaches. Also, the usage pattern
(i.e. popularity or frequency) of such media content, when
being monitored stored in a cache, can help malicious
entities to reveal user-specific private information. The
legal problem is that the copyright information cannot be
circulated in the network without the consent of the con-
tent owner. Also, any private information has to be pro-
tected from leaking in the network.
Incentives: As mentioned before, serving the user request
from the nearest cache leads to inaccuracy in benefit re-
turns the content owners should get. Measures should be
taken by which it is assured that content publishers and
subsequently content owners are informed about each
content access (even if it is served from cache). Including
acknowledgement messages in data exchange protocols,
which are send out automatically every time when content
is handled in any way can do this. The legal impact is a
dispute that can rise from such a scenario, which a content
owner can have with a content publisher when he does not
get proper incentive.
Liability: Proper counter measures against security, ille-
gal content monitoring, and privacy breach should be part
of liability division between various stakeholders. Liability
makes the stakeholder responsible for the damage or loss
caused by his actions. Liability identification makes it
possible for the court to resolve any disputes, since respon-
sibilities can be traced back.
In order to safeguard the content from illegal access
and to protect content owners and end-users from loosing
their private information of any sort, a DTLS-based solu-
tion (cf. Section V) is proposed. If the cache is accessed via
performing an authentication process, it overcomes the
problem of leaking copyrighted material to unauthenti-
cated content subscribers. This process also makes it pos-
sible, even in the case of copied content on caches, to give
legitimate incentives to the content publisher.
This solution makes sure that only authenticated and
content subscribers have access to the content in the
cache. This would prevent copyright, privacy infringe-
ment, and achieve in giving appropriate incentive to the
content owner. The drawback of the proposed solution is
the latency, which occurs, when authent#Imitpunkt#ca-
tion is performed and access tickets must be requested and
generated. For this performance the devices must have
enough resources, especially memory for key storage and
energy for upcoming encryptions and calculations.
Access control to cached data is restricted by users
attestation specification, where access rights are defined,
or by law restrictions applied to ISP (e.g., no access to
content from the US). One solution to control data access
can be reached by an authentication of communication
partners, which must identify themselves and present a
corresponding access ticket to the stakeholder of the data
cached. Such an authentication can be achieved by in-
tegrating a two-way authentication handshake into the
communication process before the data exchange takes
place [19] recommends adding access-ticketing solution to
the process. This means, that the subscriber must present
an access ticket to the publisher in order to prove his legit-
imation for the requested content. In general, those access
tickets include an expiration date stamp, which regulates
the acceptance of the ticket. If session resumption occurs,
due to a connection loss, it is possible to reuse the access
ticket if it is still valid. In this case, the two-way authentica-
tionhandshake canbe shortened (cf. SectionV-B).
V Application scenario for data
access and exchange
The project FLAMINGO currently investigates theoretically
access regulations on user-generated content published in
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the Internet [12]. An application scenario is given in the
project SmartenIT [37], which develops practical solutions
for publishing user-generated content and content access
in the Internet.
For example, in the global service mobility scenario by
SmartenIT where data, which includes sensitive informa-
tion, is exchanged via a number of hops over longer dis-
tances and perhaps is cached in between. PiCsMu deals
with a variation of the aforementioned topic, because it is
a file storage and file sharing application [22]. Here sensi-
tive data is represented by file content itself and content
owner information. The data is fragmented and encrypted
before it is stored on different cloud service providers and
can only be accessed by authorized users. Before users
access requested data they have to prove their access
rights, which is mainly investigated in the FLAMINGO
project. Due to the fact that the stored data is encrypted the
subscribers must have the correct key in order to decrypt
accessed data correctly.
A Scenario Description
Figure 1 illustrates the scenarios for this paper and it is
assumed that a content owner wants to publish any kind
of data on the Internet in order to make it available for
different types of subscribers, like users or application
programs. Data is transmitted to a server connected to the
cloud and content includes sensitive information regard-
ing the content owner. Several users, who are located in
different ISP zones (e.g., located in the USA or Europe),
want to access the published data. This is possible in
several ways as illustrated in an abstract way in Figure 1:
1) Direct content request from the server as processed by
user 1 in ISP1.
2) Indirect content request via an intermediate hop as it
is the case for user 2.
3) Content request from an ISP via a nearby cache, which
is located between the server and the ISP, as processed
by user 3 and 4.
4) Users, such as 1 and 2 located in ISP1, can access the
published data using the cache of another ISP (e.g.,
ISP 2). Although, this can happen only, when ISPs
have contracts and have agreed to provide each other
access to their caches. If no agreement exists the data
cannot be accessed using this specific cache. There-
fore, another location must be found where access
rights exist (e.g., users in ISP 1 can contact the server –
YouTube – directly).
B Recommended Access Regulations
Due to the fact that the content owner always has linked
private and sensitive information to published content, the
authors of this paper recommend that the access to the
cached data must be restricted and the subscriber must be
authorized. Therefore, it is a suitable option to work with
access ticketing solutions as specified in [28] and [3]. Ac-
cess ticketing solutions allow for a content subscriber to
present a temporary access right for the content owned by
the content publisher. The content subscriber receives (cf.
Figure 3) the access ticket from an Access Control Server
(ACS). The access rights are based on legal rules and
regulations that are bound to the content as mentioned in
Section. III and are included in the access ticket received
from the ACS. For example, a content subscriber might
only have the right to access data, which is available in its
ISP range (e.g., Europe). This ticket is presented to the
content publisher, which has to accept or deny the access
request. If the ticket was accepted a data exchange could
take place, but might be performed over an unsecured
communication channel.pt?>
Fig. 3: Process fromGenerating Access Tickets until Final Data
Transfer.
In the next step a DTLS-secured channel is established,
where participating communication entities perform a
DTLS handshake before exchanging the data itself. In case
of the scenario considered in Figure 3 the ACS, the subscri-
ber, and the publisher represent communication entities.
Areas marked in grey include the message exchange per-
formed during the DTLS handshake. In general, different
authentication options exist for the DTLS handshake de-
pending on the requested security level by entities: Either
only one of the communication entities has to authenticate
(e.g., server or client) or both entities authenticate each
other (termed mutual authentication). The highest level of
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security is gained, if both entities perform the mutual
authentication by using certificates, which are signed by a
trusted third party (e.g., certificate authority) and pre-
sented to the other entity.
For a high trustworthiness it is recommended that
communication entities perform a two-way authentication
handshake as proposed in [19]. The original solution fo-
cuses on very constraint hardware, and is transferred here
withminor modifications (e.g., message content, messages
sizes, or certificate types) to more resource-full devices,
like ISP routers. This approach is based on RFC 4347 [32]
and assumes that no fragmentation of messages is re-
quired, which allows for an UDP support. Figure 3 illus-
trates that the two-way authentication handshake will be
performed twice, if access ticketing is assumed as moti-
vated before. This means for the communication partners
different roles occur: The first handshake takes place be-
tween the ACS and the content subscriber in order to gen-
erate the access ticket. In terms of RFC 4347 the ACS is the
server and the content subscriber client. After the access
ticket was generated and accepted by the content pro-
vider the second handshake takes place, where in terms of
RFC 4347 the content provider acts as server.
The DTLS handshake performed includes the follow-
ingmessage exchanges based on reference [32]:
1) The client sends a ClientHello including a cookie (or
the access ticket) to the server.
2) The server has two possibilities to react: If the server is
unable to verify the cookie (or the access ticket) re-
ceived, the server sends back a HelloVerifyRequest in-
cluding the cookie in order to check the aliveness of
the client. If the server can handle the handshake
latency (e.g., accepting older access tickets by client),
the server skips the HelloVerifyRequest and sends the
ServerHello directly to the client.
3) The client sends a ClientHello including the supported
protocol version and cipher suites.
4) The server answers with a block of messages including
a ServerHello with the chosen cipher suite and half
pre-master secret, a Certificate in order to authenti-
cate, a CertificateRequest to the client, where client
should authenticate itself, and a ServerHelloDone.
5) The client answers with a block of messages inclu-
ding a Certificate, ClientKeyEchange, CertificateVerify,
Change-CipherSpec announcing the cipher suite and
keyingmaterial negotiated, and closeswith a Finished.
6) The server concludes the handshake with sensing a
ChangeCipherSpec and a Finished to the client.
The first two message exchanges are optional and can be
dropped, if the client and server support session resump-
tion or just perform the TLS handshake. The message
Finish is essential to show to the other communication
party that the handshake is concluded and the handshake
was performed successfully, followed by secure data ex-
change. In reference [19] it is pointed out that the most
trustful handshake can be performed when communica-
tion entities include Trusted PlatformModules (TPM).With
this add-on the trusted computing functionality can be
performed, which means that the trust of a system is based
on the hardware and software configuration [4]. In con-
crete terms this means that a chain of trust is build from
the booting of the system until a key generation, resulting
in a storage root key. This key is stored in a tamper-proof
storage in the TPM and never leaves it. If keys are required
for a secure communication, special keys are derived from
the storage root key (e.g., signature key, symmetric or
asymmetric keys) [4].
For further details of a suitable implementation see
[19], [35] on security aspects and [34] on an evaluation.
C Proof of Concept
This solution proposed does not only provide for a security
assurance for content transmission, but also has its funda-
mental basis in mandates provided by legal and regulative
organizations across Switzerland, EU, and the USA. In
order to illustrate the mapping of the recommended solu-
tion to the legal implications explained in Section IV, the
scenario assumed and as shown in Figure 1 are as follows:
Consider case 4 of the scenario, where user 1 of an ISP zone
(here ISP 1) tries to access content, which is stored in a
nearby cache owned by another ISP (here ISP 2). As soon
as an authentication-based system is integrated it fulfills
the legal requirements by (a) checking access rights of the
content requesting entity (e.g., end-user or ISP) as soon as
copyrighted material from caches is requested, (b) giving a
notification to the content owner and/or content publisher
whenever the content is being viewed or downloaded by
anyone in the network, and (c) preventingillegal access for
any sort of content stored in the network, so that malicious
users cannot retrieve sensitive information.
The authentication system also sends information to
the original server, each time a cached copy of the content
is accessed. In such a way incentives of stakeholders are
also assured, since a content owner/publisher receives a
notification each timewhen content is accessed.
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VI Summary, conclusions, and
future work
This paper discusses the impact of legal regulations on
user-generated content, which infiuences data access reg-
ulations for published data in the Internet. This kind of
content is specifically attached with sensitive and private
information of both content owner and the end-user.
Therefore, caching such content within a network is prone
to various legal constraints in terms of privacy, copyright,
and data protection. These constraints act as measures to
protect the private information linked to the content. This
work identifies the protection in terms of service manage-
ment functionality, especially copyright and privacy is-
sues as a necessity. Caching of content also raises doubts
on liability issues and on giving appropriate benefits to the
content owner actualizing incentives by an appropriate
method. This paper proposes a solution for implementing
these legal constraints in practice within the network man-
agement. It ensures that (a) the private information is not
shared with unauthenticated users, and (b) incentives
are accurately given to relevant stakeholders (e.g., con-
tent owner, content publisher). The solution proposes to
authenticate any entity, which tries to access the content
from the cache, by performing a DTLS-based handshake.
This access is granted to users who have the right and
privilege to view the content.
Concluding, legislative bodies should identify the lia-
bility of any inappropriate event due to anomalous access
to the data or respective privacy attacks. Implementing
laws that identify each stakeholder’s liability of privacy
protection of the content can do this. In order to take
complete advantage of the efficiency of caching in the net-
work, it is necessary to adopt content delivery systems
according to the legal framework and requirements. Such
systems have to incorporate the privacy protection require-
ments in the their strategy of storing and transmitting
user-generated content via caches. The maximum benefit
of content delivery systems can only be achieved when
private, sensitive, and personal information of content
owner and content subscriber is fully protected.
As part of future work, this proposed solution will be
implemented to investigate its effects on the efficiency of a
cache-based content delivery based on functional advan-
tages, which were evaluated and discussed in this paper.
The overhead due to the authentication is the prime factor
that has be monitored and evaluated. Furthermore, a ma-
jor challenge of this implementation is the translation of
legal rules into a machine understandable format. This
means that the access will only be granted to those sub-
scribers, who do not violate a legal mandate in terms
of privacy and copyright. Translating and implementing
these rules for a broad geographical region (e.g., Switzer-
land, EU, and the USA) is more complicated, as the legal
basis and implications becomesmore intricate and varied.
As mentioned in Section IV subscribers must prove
their access rights and know the key for encryption pur-
poses. But if the subscriber looses its access right, leaves
the network or is attacked, it is important to secure the data
in the network. Periodically updating the used cipher
suites and keying material in the network can do this.
Therefore, the projects FLAMINGO and SmartenIT can in-
vestigate key management and revocation issues in the
future.
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